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A B S T R A C T
Enhancing human cooperation in the use of limited and depletable resources is of central concern to environ-
mental management and human welfare. Behavioral models of cooperation have, to date, focused on inter-party
dynamics such as reciprocity, punishment, or reputation in distribution of resources generally indexed by points,
money, or effort. We argue that these models fail to account for a key driver of cooperative behavior – the non-
monetary value people attach to resources. Across two behavioral experiments we model the effect of attaching
non-monetary value to a resource within a resource dilemma game. When players believed that exhausting a
resource would lead to the immediate death of live crickets they reduced personal consumption, equating to
increased cooperation and greater collective benefit, relative to players given the standard instructions. Our
findings provide insight into a largely untapped avenue through which to leverage cooperative behavior; em-
phasizing the non-monetary and non-tradable value of a resource.
Resource management presents a variety of dilemmas in everyday
life. Most valuable resources are scarce and decisions on how to allocate
these amongst stakeholders are bound up with issues of fairness, co-
operation, and trust. Human behavior within resource dilemma games
has been modelled, providing insight into key drivers of consumption
and cooperation (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Rand & Nowak,
2013; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Ubiquitous to
these models is the use of money, points, time, or effort, as re-
presentative of scarce resources that need to be allocated to “players” in
the game, providing an understanding of how fundamental dynamics,
such as reciprocity, punishment and social reputation, guide human
decision-making processes (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Feinberg, Willer, &
Schultz, 2014; Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Yamagishi,
1986; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, & Liu,
2017; Rapp, Engelman, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2017; Wu, Balliet, &
Van Lange, 2016a,b). These models have been drawn upon by re-
searchers and policy makers to suggest ways to promote conservation of
natural environments. We argue, however, that these classic models of
human behavior are limited for this purpose as they fail to account for a
key guide to behavior – the non-monetary value people attach to re-
sources themselves. We propose that modelling this additional source of
value has the potential to generate novel insight into key drivers of
human cooperation: to illuminate how human behavior might be
shaped by the value people may attach to aspects of the natural en-
vironment itself.
1. What is the non-monetary value of a resource?
A resource is commonly viewed as something from which benefit
can be derived. In a market economy, this benefit is frequently under-
stood within the framework of economic or monetary value; money is
the medium through which resources are traded and consumed. This
view of a resources value is, however, unnecessarily narrow and fails to
account for other sources of value that people may attach to a resource.
For instance, although minerals, trees, or animals are commonly traded
based on their utility to satisfy human needs, people also have an innate
tendency to seek connection with animals and nature (Wilson, 1984)
and commonly develop a sense of solidarity with animals (Amiot &
Bastian, 2017). This desire for connection with animals and nature
represents a source of value that cannot be monetized and therefore
cannot be traded.
One way in which this source of value manifests in resource decision
making, is by increasing the value that people personally place on the
resource. For instance, the well-known ‘endowment effect’
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demonstrates that people tend to place increased value on an object
simply because they own it (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). This
type of personal or sentimental value has also been documented in what
has been referred to as ‘the effort paradox’ (Inzlicht, Shenhay, &
Olivola, 2018), which describes the phenomenon whereby expending
effort to secure a resource increases its value to the individual who
expended that effort (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Lewis, 1965;
Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994; Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012).
Testing this within a public goods game, Muehlbacher and Kirchler
(2009) found that when people had to expend greater effort to earn
endowments, they were less likely to contribute those endowments to
the public good. Conversely, unexpected and easily earnt windfalls tend
to be spent more easily (Arkes et al., 1994). Critically, although effort
exerted in the construction of a resource may increase its monetary
value within the marketplace (e.g., artisan goods have greater monetary
value than factory made goods; Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt,
2004), here we are focused on sources of personal or sentimental value
that cannot be transferred to others and therefore cannot be traded (i.e.,
the effort I exert to earn a resource does not increase its value for
someone else).
Beyond increasing the personal value of a resource, the non-
monetary value of a resource may also lead people to want to protect or
preserve it. For instance, research shows that people frequently attach
sentimental value to objects, such as family heirlooms or gifts (Belk,
1991; Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981). Sentimentality in-
creases satisfaction with an object and reduces hedonic adaptation to its
rewarding features (Yang & Galak, 2015). Critically, as with value de-
rived from effort or ownership this value cannot be traded or trans-
ferred to others, but it also leads people to want to protect or preserve
that resource. While the effort expended to secure a nice meal may
increase its level of personal reward upon consumption, sentimental
value arises when an object is associated with a cherished event or
person (Yang & Galak, 2015). This source of value is lost when the
object or resource is destroyed or consumed in the service of other ends.
Another source of non-monetary value that both increases a re-
source's personal value and the motivation to protect or preserve its
integrity is its moral significance. For instance, research shows that
although people frequently eat meat, raising awareness of an animal's
mental capacity creates a moral conflict and reduces personal meat
consumption (i.e., because highlighting an animals' ability to think and
feel makes the act of harming it seem morally wrong; Bastian,
Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012b; Ruby, 2012). The moral sig-
nificance of an animal is, therefore, a source of value that people care
about, but which cannot be traded and does not increase personal sa-
tisfaction through consumption.
Extending on this theme, other research shows that people report
feeling a moral obligation to protect both animals and the environment
from destruction and harm (Bratanova, Loughnan, & Gatersleben, 2012;
Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016) and that harm from human
activities such as mining is considered a moral principle across coun-
tries (Bastian, Zhang, & Moffat, 2015). Furthermore, the desire to
protect can be motivated by moral emotions such as guilt (Rees, Klug, &
Bamberg, 2015) and goes beyond a wish to simply ensure ongoing
access to resources for humans; people also want to preserve environ-
mental entities for their own sake (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Stern &
Dietz, 1994; Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995; McCarthy, 2016, see also
UNESCOs world heritage list).
Together the evidence indicates that people may value resources in
ways that are not directly linked to their own consumption needs and
cannot be transferred or traded. These sources of value cannot therefore
be directly modelled using derivatives such as points or money. The
non-monetary value that people attach to a resource – such as a sense of
personal connection, feelings of empathy, or the felt moral obligation to
protect it – can shape resource use and this shift in priorities may have
implications for human cooperation.
2. Non-monetary value and resource consumption
Increasing cooperation is especially important in contexts where
resources are finite, or replenish at a slow rate, meaning that overuse
leads to environmental degradation and an inability to satisfy stake-
holder needs. Cooperative behavior within these contexts is defined as
limiting one's personal consumption for the benefit of the larger col-
lective and is commonly modelled within resource dilemma games
where players can take a variable amount of a common limited resource
which replenishes at a given rate. Cooperation ensures that the resource
“survives”. Yet, defection frequently occurs (indexed by some players
taking more for themselves) leading to erosion of trust and cooperative
behavior (e.g., Rand & Nowak, 2013).
We suggest that highlighting the non-monetary value of a resource
may alter this cooperation dilemma by cueing people to focus on an
additional cost of personal consumption. Whereas traditional dilemmas
pit the value of increased personal consumption against outcomes for
other players, the non-monetary value of a resource may lead people to
limit personal consumption because they want to protect the resource
and would not like to see it destroyed.
There are several avenues through which people may become sen-
sitive to this additional cost. First, people may be emotionally driven to
protect a resource because they have developed a sentimental connec-
tion to it or feel a sense of empathy for it. This may be drive by our
tendency to develop psychologically important relationships with ani-
mals (Amiot & Bastian, 2015) and our emotional sensitivity to animal
harm (Westbury & Neumann, 2008). As noted above, people also fre-
quently develop meaningful and sentimental connections to objects
(Epley, Akalis, Watyz & Cacioppo, 2008; Yang & Galak, 2015). Thus,
presenting the suggestion to people that something they personally care
about could be ‘harmed’ is likely to increase their motivation to protect,
thereby limiting consumption.
Second, people may hold moral principles or form moral judgements
about how a particular resource should be treated. Prohibitions against
harming others are among the most widely and deeply held moral be-
liefs (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012) and
deliberately inflicted harm can evoke anger, disgust, and contempt,
which are powerful, aversive, and action-oriented moral emotions
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). When people are cued to consider the
capacity of a resource to suffer from its own destruction they may act in
ways to preserve or protect it. Beyond perceptions of harm, moral
judgements about preservation may also arise in response to a range of
broader moral considerations, such the belief that a resource has sacred
value (Frimer, Tell, & Haidt, 2015) or the belief that causing harm to
the resource, even for financial gain, would transgress a sacred prin-
ciple (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Graham et al., 2009; Fiske & Tetlock,
1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). For instance,
when people see actions toward the environment as a matter of moral
principle, they are also more resistant to commodification of natural
assets, even when it could lead to environmental benefit (Sacchi, Riva,
Brambilla, & Grasso, 2014).
Third, people may also rely on heuristic processing when con-
sidering the notion that something may be ‘harmed’ or ‘destroyed’.
There is indeed some evidence for heuristic harm aversion. For example,
research shows that people have an aversion to ‘harmful actions’ (e.g.,
pointing a gun at a person when it is not loaded), even when those
actions do not cause harm (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012).
Other work shows that the impact of engaging in harmful actions
against avatars within a virtual environment has similar implications
for self-perception as when those actions have the potential to cause
real interpersonal harm (Bastian et al., 2013; Bastian, Jetten, & Radke,
2012a). When people become aware that their consumption is asso-
ciated with ‘destruction’ or ‘harm’ they may become sensitive to these
negative associations irrespective of whether that harm is considered
morally wrong or elicits an empathic reaction.
In the current research, we aimed to examine whether highlighting
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the non-monetary value of a resource – specifically, the type of value
that cannot be traded with points or money and which motivates a
desire to protect rather than consume – has the potential to increase
cooperative behavior via reduced personal consumption, even when
faced with competition for that resource. We did not aim to test which
specific pathway could account for any observed effects – empathy,
moral judgement, or heuristic harm aversion. Instead, we aimed to
conduct an initial investigation into an added factor influencing the
extent of human cooperation that goes above and beyond a prior focus
on reputational factors and individual social values that underlie co-
operative decision making.
3. Study 1
To examine whether adding moral significance to the resource itself
can increase cooperation through limiting personal consumption, we
conducted two lab-based studies where participants, exposed to one of
two experimental conditions, played a resource dilemma game. In the
experimental condition, the resource consumed by the participants had
non-monetary value attached to it. Specifically, participants were in-
formed that if the resource became depleted, because players took too
many points from a share resource pool, it could lead to the death of
live crickets. We used this approach because it modelled the type of
added value we are focused on. The value of keeping crickets alive, as
opposed to letting them be destroyed, is not something that can be
traded, and it does not increase the reward associated with personal
consumption. To the extent that people do not like the idea of crickets
being destroyed, it leads people to want to conserve the resource for
reasons unrelated to their own outcomes or to the outcomes of other
players in the game. Furthermore, it is a source of value attached (in
this case indirectly) to the resource itself, as opposed to non-monetary
interpersonal outcomes which have been the focus of previous research
(e.g., Foa, 1971; Foa & Foa, 1980). We compared this to a control
condition which used the standard approach to a resource dilemma,
where participants are only made aware their behavior has implications
for how a resource is distributed to themselves and the other players in
the game. We predicted reduced consumption, therefore indicating a
tendency towards increased cooperative behavior, in the experimental
condition.
In addition to our main prediction, and to provide further nuance to
our findings, we included several individual difference measures. This
included a measure of empathy and a measure of moral expansiveness
(i.e., the extent to which people tend to feel morally obligated to take
account of the interests of others, including non-humans). Although we
did not have strong predictions given the novelty of our paradigm, we
expected that empathy and moral expansiveness might interact with
condition, such that high scorers on these constructs would be more
concerned about the destruction of crickets and therefore would limit
their personal consumption, relative to low scorers. In addition to these
more focused measures, we also included general measures of person-
ality based on a recent review by Zhao and Smillie (2015) which found




Using G-Power it was determined that to detect a medium effect size
of d=0.5 at 80% probability, we would require a sample size of
N=102. To increase power, we aimed for N=125. One hundred and
twenty-seven first year male and female psychology students from the
University of New South Wales participated in the study for course
credit. Demographic data was collected on-line prior to the experiment,
and due to a large proportion of missing responses we were not able to
provide accurate descriptive for the sample.
3.1.2. Measures
In an initial online survey we administered the Davis’s (1983) In-
terpersonal Reactivity Index (with subscales relating to empathic con-
cern, seven items; M=3.90, SD=0.57, α=0.77, and perspective
taking, seven items; M=3.67, SD=0.60, α=0.80) and the Moral
Expansiveness Scale, which is designed to measure the felt moral ob-
ligation that a person feels towards a variety of entities (both human
and non-human) with higher scores indicative of a more expansive
sense of moral obligation (M=44.65, SD=12.86, α=0.93; for a full
overview of the theory and measure see Crimston et al., 2016).1 Prior to
completing the experimental procedure participants also completed the
HEXACO-PI personality questionnaire (Lee & Ashton, 2004) and the
BFAS Extraversion subscale (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) in line
with suggestions by Zhao and Smillie (2015).
3.1.3. Procedure
After enrolling for the study online, participants were provided with
a link and asked to complete some on-line questionnaires at least 24 h
before the lab study (see Measures). This was designed to reduce any
priming effects that answering these measures might have on behavior.
The experiment was run in groups of five participants per session.
The participants were randomly assigned to an experimental (n= 65)
or control (n= 62) condition within sessions, alternating between three
experimental/two control participants, and two experimental/three
control participants. Upon arriving for the experiment, the participants
were seated in individual computer rooms, where they completed the
personality questionnaires (see Measures). Each room was fully en-
closed, and participants were unable to see each other. We wanted
participants to know that others were present, so they would believe
that they were playing with other people. But, to allow for individual-
level analysis of the data, we ensured that participants in each game did
not interact at any point during the experimental procedure in case it
created a group dynamic. Therefore, the researcher explained the in-
structions to participants individually in separate computer rooms.
Participants were told that the study was exploring how people
make decisions in a group context, and that they would be completing a
collective decision-making task with four others (for detailed task ex-
planation, see supplemental material). It was explained to them that
they would be sharing a pool of 3000 points that would be converted to
money and paid to them at the end of the game (each point worth two
cents). They were informed that they could take up to 30 points on one
round and that the amount in the pool would be recalculated at the end
of each round and would then replenish by 1%. They were told that if
people took too many points the pool would become depleted, and that
there was a critical, although variable, threshold somewhere below
1500 points.
Participants in the control condition were given the usual instruc-
tions for this game; that if the threshold was reached the game would
stop and further points could not be earned if this were to occur.
Participants in the experimental condition were taken individually to
another cubicle, where there was a computer connected to a coffee
grinder that had a black funnel attached to the top of it. They were told
that if the threshold was reached, two things could happen. First, the
game would stop, and they would be unable to earn any more points
(standard instructions), but that secondly, the computer in the room
would be monitoring the number of points in the pool, and that it was
also connected to the coffee grinder. Participants in the experimental
condition were then shown how the computer could activate the
grinder: The grinder was sitting on a desk, next to the computer
monitor (see Fig. S1 in supplemental material). The computer screen
1We also included the Triple Dominance Measure (TDM; Van Lange, DeBruin,
Otten, & Joireman, 1997), but did not analyse these data as many participants
(Study 1, n= 40; Study 2, n= 52) could not be categorized according to
scoring instructions.
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had the same display that participants would see when completing the
experiment. This consisted of an empty box in the center of a white
screen, accompanied by black text which read “Please indicate how
many points you would like to take from the pool (Note: you may take a
maximum of 30 points).” We explained that, for the purpose of the
demonstration, the pool had been reduced to a level just above the
threshold, and that we would take the maximum number of points to
show what could happen if that threshold was reached. The researcher
then typed “30” into the box and clicked enter. A message appeared on
the screen for 3 s, saying “Please wait: The computer is calculating the
pool amount”. A message then appeared in red font in the center of the
screen, saying “THRESHOLD REACHED”, at which point the coffee
grinder switched on for 5 s.
Next, participants were shown the crickets. They were kept in four
vials, with three to four crickets in each vial (see Fig. S2; this was
adapted from similar methods employed in a study by Martens, Kosloff,
Greenberg, Landau, & Schmader, 2007). A plastic storage container that
housed other crickets was also in the room, sitting to the right of the
computer monitor. The researcher pointed this out to participants to
convince them that we had a large enough supply to allow us to kill
several crickets per session. The researcher then explained that before
the task started they would be placing the crickets into the coffee
grinder, reiterating that the computer would be monitoring the number
of points in the pool, and that if the threshold was reached, the game
would stop and the grinder could be switched on with the crickets in-
side. Participants were assured that ethics approval had been granted,
and that previous studies had used similar paradigms. Participants were
told that they would be unable to see how many points were left in the
pool after the task had started, and that all of their responses would be
anonymous. The participants then returned to their computer cubicles.
After every participant had received the instructions, the researcher
walked around to each cubicle to log the participants into the experi-
ment. For those in the experimental condition, the researcher carried
four empty vials to create the impression that the crickets had been
placed into the grinder. Participants were told that once the researcher
had finished logging in all participants, a message would appear on the
screen to inform them that everyone had been logged in, and that the
task would then begin in 10 s. In reality, the computers were not linked
together, and the participants did not commence the task at exactly the
same time. Rather, after a participant had been logged in, there was
always a 90 s wait before they were told that the task was ready to
begin. We chose a 90 s interval so that participants would believe that
the researcher had enough time to log in all of the participants before
the task commenced. During this time, a message appeared on the
screen which reminded participants of the task instructions. A second
message then appeared, saying “All participants are now logged in. The
task will begin in 10 s” The task then loaded automatically.
Once the task began, in each round the display would show a text,
saying “Using the number pad, please indicate how many points you
would like to take from the pool (Note: You may take a maximum of 30
points).” The participants responded by typing the points they wished
to take with the number pad. If participants entered a number greater
than 30, the computer would not let them proceed. If participants en-
tered their points within 5 s of the round starting, a message appeared
on the screen for 3 s, saying “Please wait: The other players are making
their decisions”. Another message then appeared on the screen for 2 s,
saying “Please wait: The computer is calculating the pool amount”. The
screen then went blank for 2 s before the next round commenced. The
round number was displayed in the top left corner of the screen, and the
number of points that the participant had accumulated was displayed in
the top right corner.
In actuality, the participants were not really playing with one an-
other, and the task was programmed to last 20 rounds. At the end of the
tenth round, a yellow warning sign (a triangle with an exclamation
point in its center) appeared on the screen for 8 s, accompanied by the
text “Warning: The pool is depleting.” At the end of the fifteenth round,
a red warning sign appeared on the screen for 8 s, accompanied by the
text “Warning: The pool is in danger of reaching the threshold.” The
task finished after the twentieth round, and a message appeared on the
screen saying “The task is now over. For the final part of the experi-
ment, we'd like you to answer a few quick questions, beginning on the
next page.”
Participants then answered the following questions, which appeared
one at a time in a random order: To what extent were your responses
motivated by concerns about financial gain? To what extent were your
responses motivated by concerns about what you thought the other
players were doing? To what extent were your responses motivated by
concerns for the crickets (experimental condition only)? Participants
responded to each question by clicking on a nine-point Likert scale
(1=not at all, 5= to some extent, 9= very much).
Participants took approximately 45min to complete the study. At
the end of the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed. We used a
funnel debriefing procedure first examining whether participants felt
they had insight into the research question, with further probing used to
determine if they had guessed the aims of the study. Specifically, the
experimenter asked, “Does anyone have any idea what the study was
about?“. If a vague answer was provided (e.g., It was about coopera-
tion), the experimenter encouraged them to elaborate (“Can you tell me
more about that?“). None of the participants correctly guessed the aims.
We also probed for suspicion into the two aspects of deception used in
the study, a) that computers were not linked and therefore player re-
sponses were not linked, and b) that there was never any chance that
the crickets would be harmed. Only two participants expressed having
doubts that the computers were linked. Further, only three participants
expressed doubts that the crickets would really be destroyed. As these
doubts were only expressed after the sources of deception had been
revealed to participants and given that removing these participants did
not change the findings of the study, we opted to retain these data for
analyses.
3.2. Results and discussion
We performed independent sample t-tests to explore differences
between the two conditions. As predicted, participants in the experi-
mental condition (M=198.46, SD=127.60) took significantly fewer
points than participants in the control condition (M=276.10,
SD=162.32), t(115.77)= 2.99, p= .003, d=0.53 (see Fig. 1; for
comparison of means for each individual trial, see Table S1 in supple-
mental material). This provided initial evidence that adding non-
monetary value to a resource can reduce personal consumption, thereby
increasing cooperation. Noteworthy is that this mean difference in
condition was relatively stable across rounds, showing a similar pattern
across time. When warnings were provided in rounds 10 and 15 con-
sumption dropped in both conditions, but then slowly increased. This
suggests that participants were sensitive to depleting the pool of re-
sources in both cases, but that adding non-monetary value to the re-
source dampened consumption across all rounds.
There was no significant difference between conditions in the extent
to which participants’ responses were motivated by financial gain (ex-
perimental group: M=4.51, SD=2.18; control group: M=4.92,
SD=2.24), t(125)= 1.05, p= .30) or by the behavior of other players
(experimental group: M=6.28, SD=2.04; control group: M=5.97,
SD=2.19), t(125)= -0.83, p= .41). This suggested that the difference
between conditions was unrelated to concern for personal gain or
concern for signals of cooperation or defection from other parties.
Concern expressed for the crickets in the experimental condition
was at around the mid-point of the scale (M=5.35, SD=2.85). Paired
samples t-tests (within the experimental condition only) revealed no
significant differences between the reported level of motivation for fi-
nancial gain relative to concern for the crickets (t=1.59, p= .116).
Motivation related to other player behavior was higher compared to
both financial gain (t=2.43, p < .001) and concern for the crickets
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(t=1.75, p= .030). To investigate how these different motivations
were related to behavior within the experimental condition we in-
spected correlations with total points taken. This revealed that concern
for financial gain was associated with taking more points (r=0.33,
p= .008) and concern for crickets was associated with taking fewer
points (r=−0.25, p= .043). Concern regarding other player behavior
was unrelated to points taken (r=−0.09, p= .488). Also noteworthy
is the negative correlation between concern for financial gain and
concern for the crickets (r=−0.44, p < 001) and the absence of any
correlation between concern for other player behavior and either fi-
nancial gain (r=0.19, p= .123) or concern for the crickets (r=0.09,
p= .460).
Overall, we take these responses to indicate that people were con-
cerned regarding the destruction of crickets and this motivated them to
restrict their personal consumption. This contrasts with the effect of
financial concern increasing personal consumption. Interestingly, al-
though expressed concern for the behavior of other players was higher
relative to concern for finances or crickets, this motivation was un-
related to behavior, perhaps because the influence of this motive would
depend on what the player assumed about others’ behavior.
Analysis of the individual difference variables (see Table 1) revealed
overall limited associations with behavior and no significant interaction
with condition (after applying a correction for family-wise error). This
suggests that although people were concerned for the lives of crickets in
the experimental context, this did not interact with broader individual
differences in empathy or moral expansiveness. We also examined the
relationship between our individual difference variables and motiva-
tions (after applying a correction for family-wise error, see Table S4).
This revealed only one significant relationship across all variables.
Overall, adding a condition in which the resource had moral sig-
nificance led to a new source of motivation that departed from previous
studies in which individual differences have been found to reliably
predict behavior.
4. Study 2
The behavioral data from Study 1 demonstrated that attaching
moral significance to a resource enhanced cooperation in a standard
resource dilemma game. In Study 2, to investigate how perceived de-
fection from other players would influence cooperation, participants
were provided with fictitious information about a player who was
taking the most points. Also, participants were given the opportunity to
punish the greediest player. We predicted that moral concern for the
resource would prompt participants in the experimental condition to
treat overconsumption as a more severe defection than in the control
condition, and thus exert greater punishments.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
We used the same recruitment strategy as in Study 1. One-hundred
and twenty-six students from the University of New South Wales par-
ticipated in the study (59% females, mean age=20.24 years2). We
excluded two participants’ data (both in the experimental condition);
one because they expressed significant doubt over the study protocol
throughout the study and the other because they had participated in
Study 1. This left n= 62 in the experimental condition and n= 62 in
the control condition. Participants received either course credit or $15
in exchange for their time.
4.1.2. Measures

























Fig. 1. Mean number of points taken by participants in the experimental and control conditions over the 20 rounds (error bars equal one S.E.M). The first warning
message appeared at the end of round 10; the second warning message appeared at the end of round 15.
2 Gender and age data were collected in the pre-survey which had a low re-
sponse rate. There were 47 cases missing and for this reason we report gender
as a relative percentage.
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4.1.3. Procedure
The method was identical to Study 1, except for the following:
Participants were told that at the beginning of the task each player
would be assigned a unique player number (in fact, each participant
was assigned to be Player 5). They were also told that at the end of each
round, they would be able to see which of the other players took the
most on that round, and how many points that player took. Participants
were told that if they were to take the most on a given round, they
would not see their own player number displayed; rather, they would
see which player other than themselves took the most on that round.
Again, participants were not in actuality playing with one another,
and all of the feedback was bogus. We based this feedback on the results
from Study 1: for the first seven rounds, the greediest players took the
equivalent of the grand mean for each round (14–18 points). During
these rounds, each of the other players took the most points at least
once. On the eighth round, the greediest players began taking a full
standard deviation above the grand mean on each round (25–30
points). Participants saw that “Player 4” took the most points on 10 out
of 13 of these rounds (see Table S2 in supplemental material for de-
tails).
The task finished at the end of the twentieth round, and the fol-
lowing message appeared on the screen: “The task is now over. For the
next part of the experiment, we'd like you to answer a few quick
questions, beginning on the next page.” Participants then answered the
same questions about their motivations as in Study 1. This time we also
added an additional question to more generally assess how concerned
people were about exhausting the resource across both conditions: How
concerned were you about reaching the threshold? (1=not at all,
5= to some extent, 9= very much).
After answering these questions, the following message appeared on
the screen: “For the final part of the experiment, we are going to give
you the opportunity to fine a player of your choosing. However, you
will need to pay to do so. If you choose to pay one dollar, it will cost the
selected player three dollars; if you choose to pay two dollars, it will
cost the selected player six dollars; if you choose to pay three dollars, it
will cost the selected player nine dollars. If you don't want to fine
anyone, please select 0 dollars.” We told participants that if more than
one participant chose to punish the same player, that player would be
fined the average of what the players selected. Participants responded
by clicking on a dropdown tab and selecting one of the four options: 0
dollars, 1 dollar, 2 dollars, 3 dollars.
Participants took approximately 45min to complete the study. The
debriefing procedure was the same as in Study 1. Again, no participants
accurately guessed the aims of the study. After revealing the deception
used in the study only one participant expressed doubts that the crickets
would in fact be destroyed and that the defecting player (Player #4)
was real and we removed them from analyses (as described above).
4.2. Results and discussion
We then performed independent t-tests to explore differences be-
tween the two conditions. As predicted, and replicating Study 1, par-
ticipants in the experimental condition (M=325.63, SD=123.78)
took significantly fewer points than participants in the control condi-
tion (M=378.95, SD=120.68), t(122)= 2.43, p= .017, d=0.43
(see Fig. 2; for comparison of means for each individual trial, see Table
Table 1
Study 1 regression analyses main effect and interactions predicting total amount taken.
Scale (Reference) Individual Trait N Condition (β) Individual Trait Centered (β) Interaction Term (β)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) Perspective Taking 97 −0.31(26.86) −0.29(33.30) 0.09(45.29)
Empathic Concern 97 −0.31(26.89) −0.31(30.83) 0.31(48.15)
HEXACO Personality Inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004) Honesty Humility 118 −0.31(25.09)* −0.41(35.54)* 0.18(51.84)
Sincerity 118 −0.29(26.89) 0.10(28.92) −0.08(37.87)
Fairness 118 −0.27(25.03) −0.43(22.31)* 0.17(33.17)
Greed Avoidance 118 −0.30(25.53)* −0.27(18.35) 0.02(31.52)
Modesty 118 −0.31(25.71)* −0.33(25.63) 0.23(37.02)
Emotionality 118 −0.30(26.94)* −0.01(31.76) 0.01(44.79)
Fearfulness 118 −0.30(26.74)* −0.04(23.07) 0.02(31.79)
Anxiety 118 −0.30(26.56)* −0.02(25.84) −0.02(36.18)
Dependence 118 −0.31(26.89)* 0.08(21.21) −0.04(29.52)
Sentimentality 118 −0.30(26.80)* −0.06(24.06) 0.07(36.15)
Extraversion 118 −0.30(26.63)* −0.04(29.21) 0.10(42.11)
Social Self-Esteem 118 −0.30(26.69)* −0.09(28.85) 0.07(40.67)
Social Boldness 118 −0.29(26.59) 0.04(23.21) 0.07(31.70)
Sociability 118 −0.30(26.51)* −0.12(23.44) 0.17(34.73)
Liveliness 118 −0.30(26.51)* 0.03(21.15) 0.03(32.79)
Agreeableness 118 −0.31(26.09)* −0.23(31.00) 0.10(45.94)
Forgiveness 118 −0.29(26.35)* −0.12(25.68) −0.01(37.96)
Gentleness 118 −0.30(25.96)* −0.25(26.40) 0.09(37.87)
Flexibility 118 −0.30(26.17)* −0.22(25.70) 0.15(38.35)
Patience 118 −0.31(26.48)* −0.16(22.18) 0.10(32.37)
Conscientiousness 118 −0.30(26.47)* −0.04(34.17) −0.03(55.21)
Organization 118 −0.30(26.53)* 0.02(23.70) −0.07(33.78)
Diligence 118 −0.30(26.40)* −0.01(24.08) −0.09(41.67)
Perfectionism 118 −0.30(26.61)* −0.02(26.11) 0.02(37.66)
Prudence 118 −0.31(26.85)* −0.13(25.49) 0.07(42.24)
Openness 118 −0.31(26.76)* −0.04(33.67) −0.03(48.06)
Aesthetic Appreciation 118 −0.31(26.81)* −0.09(21.13) 0.02(31.91)
Inquisitiveness 118 −0.30(26.25)* 0.07(22.00) −0.19(32.21)
Creativity 118 −0.30(26.52)* −0.04(23.47) 0.08(32.65)
Unconventionality 118 −0.31(27.00)* −0.07(30.47) 0.01(44.76)
Altruism 118 −0.28(25.27)* −0.33(29.73) 0.05(47.68)
BFAS Personality Questionnaire (De Young et al., 2007) Extraversion 118 −0.30(26.51)* −0.04(34.84) 0.08(51.13)
Enthusiasm 118 −0.29(26.27)* −0.21(30.44) 0.18(46.66)
Assertiveness 118 −0.30(26.37)* 0.13(28.20) −0.04(42.79)
Moral Expansiveness Scale (Crimston et al., 2016) Moral Circle 97 −0.33(27.56)* 0.14 (1.32) −0.04 (2.28)
Note. Each individual trait was mean-centered and entered into a regression equation with condition (0=Control, 1= Experimental) and their interaction term.
*p < .00135 (Bonferroni correction).
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S3 in supplemental material). Again, this provided initial evidence that
adding non-monetary value to a resource can reduce personal con-
sumption, thereby increasing cooperation. A similar consistent mean
difference and pattern of responding across conditions over each of the
trials was observed, as in Study 1. Noteworthy was the influence of a
defector on behavior across both conditions. As defection increased
after round 8, the number of points taken by other players also in-
creased, indicating a reduction in cooperative behavior. This increase
occurred across both conditions.
Contrary to our predictions, participants in both conditions paid
similar amounts to fine the greedy player (experimental group:
M=0.48, SD=0.76; control group: M=0.47, SD=0.78) t(122)= -
0.12, p= .91. Means indicated overall punishment motivation was low,
with a mean of around fifty cents nominated towards punishing the
greedy player, out of a possible total amount of three dollars.
As in Study 1, there was no significant difference between condi-
tions in the extent to which participants’ responses were motivated by
financial gain (experimental group: M=5.53, SD=2.07; control
group: M=5.23, SD=2.23) t(122)= -0.79, p= .43) or other player
behavior (experimental group: M=6.26, SD=1.80; control group:
M=5.73, SD=2.61) t(108.44)= -1.32, p= .19. However, partici-
pants in the experimental condition (M=6.48, SD=1.60) reported
greater concern about reaching the threshold than participants in the
control condition (M=5.39, SD=2.51), t(103.38)= -2.90, p= .005.
Inspection of concern for the crickets in the experimental condition
(M=5.08, SD=2.66) revealed responses at around the mid-point of
the scale, as in Study 1. Paired samples t-tests (within the experimental
condition only) revealed no significant differences between the re-
ported level of motivation for financial gain relative to concern for the
crickets (t=1.04, p= .301), as in Study 1. Motivation related to other
player behavior was higher compared to both financial gain (t=2.92,
p= .005) and concern for crickets (t=2.91, p= .005), as in Study 1.
The new question in Study 2, regarding concern about reaching the
threshold was endorsed to a similar extent as concern for other player
behavior (t=0.89, p= .378), but more so compared to concern for
financial gain (t=3.15, p= .003) and concern for crickets (t=4.26,
p < .001). As in Study 1, we investigated how these different moti-
vations were related to behavior within the experimental condition.
This revealed that whereas concern for financial gain was associated
with taking more points (r=0.36, p= .005) concern for crickets was
associated with taking fewer points (r=−0.40, p= .001), as in Study
1. Differently to Study 1, concern for other player behavior was related
to taking more points (r=0.35, p= .005). The new question, concern
for reaching the threshold, was marginally associated with taking fewer
points (r=−0.23, p= .074).
Distinct from Study 1, concern for financial gain was not associated
with concern for the crickets (r=−0.18, p= .163) and concern for
other player behavior was positively associated with concern over fi-
nancial gain (r=0.50, p < .001) and concern for reaching the
threshold (r=0.31, p < .014). Concern for reaching the threshold was
also positively associated with concern for crickets (r=0.35, p= .005)
and for other player behavior (r=0.35, p= .005), but not with con-
cern for financial gain (r=0.18, p= .165).
Finally, correlations between motivations and punishment (within
the experimental condition) revealed none of the motivations were
associated with the amount committed to punishment (other player
behavior: r=−0.10, p= .420; threshold: r=−0.01, p= .957; fi-
nancial: r=−0.23, p= .005; crickets: r=−0.05, p= .733).
Overall, analysis of motivations provided a similar picture to Study
1, but with some important differences. People were again concerned
regarding the destruction of crickets and this motivated them to restrict
their personal consumption. This contrasts with the effect of financial
concerns increasing personal consumption. Again, mean levels of ex-




















Fig. 2. Mean number of points taken by participants in the experimental and control conditions over the 20 rounds (error bars equal one S.E.M). The greedy player
appeared after round 8; the first warning appeared after round 10; and the second warning appeared after round 15.
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financial or cricket related concerns, however, unlike Study 1, this was
strongly correlated with financial concerns and unrelated to cricket
concerns. Combined with no evidence of an increased motivation to-
wards punishment it appears that the defector was relevant to the ex-
tent that they threatened one's own personal gains. It appears people
are more concerned about the harmfulness of their own actions, rather
than the actions of others.
We next turn to an analysis of our individual difference variables
(see Table 2). As in Study 1, this revealed overall a limited influence of
individual differences in predicting behavior and none of these in-
dividual differences significantly interacted with condition to predict
behavior (after applying a correction for family-wise error). Again, we
also examined the relationship between our individual difference
variables and motivation questions (after applying a correction for fa-
mily-wise error, see Table S5). This revealed several correlations be-
tween our individual difference measures and financial concern or
concern for others, but critically there were no correlations with con-
cern for the crickets.
5. Discussion
Advancing insight into human cooperation is important for the ef-
fective management of environmental resources and human welfare.
Behavioral games have been widely employed in developing models of
cooperation and to explore factors that might enhance or diminish
cooperative behavior within collectives. Across two behavioral game
experiments we examined a novel variable in predicting the extent of
cooperative behavior – the non-monetary value attached to a resource.
We observed that players who had been led to believe that exhausting a
common resource would not only limit collective outcomes but would
also lead to the immediate death of live crickets, reduced their personal
consumption. Across both studies this change in behavior was unrelated
to financial concerns, to considerations of other player's behavior, and
was not influenced by a range of individual differences linked to co-
operative behavior. Furthermore, when faced with objective evidence
of defection by others in the game, players primed to see their resource
consumption as having moral or harm-related implications (i.e., the
death of crickets) continued to limit their consumption relative to those
who were solely focused on the collective outcomes of the group. For
those in the experimental condition, across both studies, their increased
levels of cooperation (indexed by reduced personal consumption) were
positively associated with their expressed concern for the lives of the
crickets.
Findings also indicated that individual differences did not moderate
the effect of experimental condition on points taken. We had predicted
that empathy and moral expansiveness might have increased concern
for crickets' lives in the experimental condition and therefore increased
cooperation. Although expressed concern for the crickets’ lives was
indeed associated with increased cooperation, the study may have been
underpowered to detect the influence of these more distal measures.
In everyday resource management, people are faced with a range of
moral dilemmas. Primary amongst these is whether resource allocation
is fair for other consumers. Concerns over fairness are amplified when
players are aware that they can be punished for unfair behavior or
when they are concerned about their personal reputation across mul-
tiple interactions (amongst other factors; Balliet et al., 2011; Fehr &
Table 2
Study 2 regression analyses main effect and interactions predicting total amount taken.
Scale (Reference) Individual Trait N Condition (β) Individual Trait Centered (β) Interaction Term (β)
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) Perspective Taking 75 −0.22(27.82) 0.09(33.23) −0.09(50.49)
Empathic Concern 75 −0.24(27.79) −0.08(27.15) −0.01(49.74)
HEXACO Personality Inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004) Honesty Humility 105 −0.25(23.27) −0.34(28.69) 0.11(39.52)
Sincerity 105 −0.24(24.01) −0.10(22.39) −0.04(33.39)
Fairness 105 −0.26(23.50) −0.29(17.23) 0.06(24.10)
Greed Avoidance 105 −0.22(23.57) −0.27(19.63) 0.13(27.22)
Modesty 105 −0.23(23.63) −0.23(22.99) 0.06(34.29)
Emotionality 105 −0.22(23.10) −0.34(25.57) 0.16(41.24)
Fearfulness 105 −0.21(23.80) −0.17(20.23) 0.02(30.07)
Anxiety 105 −0.23(23.31) −0.34(20.94) 0.23(32.77)
Dependence 105 −0.21(23.51) −0.28(17.35) 0.16(26.44)
Sentimentality 105 −0.23(23.48) −0.28(20.04) 0.15(31.45)
Extraversion 105 −0.22(24.26) 0.06(31.28) −0.06(47.99)
Social Self-Esteem 105 −0.22(23.96) 0.12(25.81) −0.06(36.24)
Social Boldness 105 −0.23(24.37) 0.06(23.57) −0.18(34.34)
Liveliness 105 −0.22(24.05) −0.01(20.74) 0.04(32.94)
Sociability 105 −0.22(24.25) 0.02(19.86) 0.01(34.91)
Agreeableness 105 −0.23(24.38) −0.06(36.58) 0.01(47.73)
Forgiveness 105 −0.25(24.31) −0.17(22.09) 0.03(31.56)
Gentleness 105 −0.22(24.07) 0.08(25.17) −0.09(36.46)
Flexibility 105 −0.23(24.12) −0.07(25.27) 0.03(36.63)
Patience 105 −0.22(24.15) 0.04(22.05) −0.01(29.47)
Conscientiousness 105 −0.23(24.49) −0.10(32.87) 0.05(45.35)
Diligence 105 −0.21(24.26) 0.09(27.30) −0.01(37.31)
Perfectionism 105 −0.24(24.86) −0.13(30.97) 0.06(40.74)
Prudence 105 −0.23(24.09) −0.16(24.74) 0.09(34.91)
Organization 105 −0.23(24.05) −0.09(18.67) 0.00(26.70)
Openness 105 −0.24(24.25) −0.16(31.93) 0.09(47.71)
Aesthetic Appreciation 105 −0.22(23.90) −0.13(21.39) 0.03(30.81)
Inquisitiveness 105 −0.22(24.44) −0.09(21.99) 0.12(32.75)
Creativity 105 −0.24(24.04) −0.22(19.83) 0.16(28.31)
Unconventionality 105 −0.22(24.26) 0.02(31.95) −0.05(43.17)
Altruism 105 −0.26(23.70) −0.32(24.06) 0.15(38.89)
BFAS Personality Questionnaire (De Young et al., 2007) Extraversion 103 −0.24(24.29) 0.08(31.66) −0.18(54.02)
Enthusiasm 103 −0.24(24.14) −0.11(28.83) −0.02(48.40)
Assertiveness 103 −0.23(24.08) 0.22(24.14) −0.27(40.73)
Moral Expansiveness Scale (Crimston et al., 2016) Moral Circle 75 −0.24(27.46) 0.06(1.70) 0.08(2.27)
Note. Each individual trait was mean-centered and entered into a regression equation with condition (0=Control, 1= Experimental) and their interaction term.
*p < .00135 (Bonferroni correction).
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Gächter, 2002; Feinberg et al., 2014; Van Lange et al., 2014; Wu et al.,
2016a,b; Barclay & Raihani, 2016). Yet, research in the field of beha-
vioral ethics has demonstrated that people are also concerned about the
potential harm brought to animals, forests, or historical artifacts, and
that these non-human or ecocentric factors have the capacity to shape
resource decision-making (Bastian et al., 2012a, 2012b; Crimston et al.,
2016). Our findings bring together research within the fields of beha-
vioral economics, behavioral ethics, and environmental science, sug-
gesting that the non-monetary value attached to a resource, and in turn
people's desire to protect or preserve it, shapes behavior in ways that
are unrelated to consumer outcomes. We leveraged this type of value in
our study by introducing the threat of killing crickets, an insect that is
at most considered of minimal moral relevance, thus providing a rela-
tively conservative test of our reasoning that moral significance can
promote self-constraint or cooperation. This suggests that consumer
behavior, and in turn cooperative behavior, is influenced by these
minimal factors and may also be shaped by highlighting the moral
significance of plants or trees. Unlike crickets, these entities are not
generally considered to be sentient, and therefore may not be viewed as
even minimally morally significant. Yet, it is possible that that other
factors such as sentimentality, beauty, or rarity may shape behavior in
similar ways. In short, properties that cultivate a desire to protect or
conserve a resource have the capacity to also enhance the equity of
outcomes for consumers.
Given the preponderance of studies that model human cooperation
and trust using points or money to model resources, the possibility of
varying the significance or moral implications attached to resources
themselves opens several novel avenues for research. Our findings
suggest that reputation concerns or expectations of cooperative beha-
vior may be tied, not only to treatment of other players, but also to a
consideration for the value of resources themselves. This also raises the
question of whether people are punished differently when acting
against the interests of other consumers to protect a resource vs. when
seeking to maximize their own outcomes, and whether people know-
ingly use resource protection to send cooperative signals to others.
Indeed, those who destroy the natural environment are viewed as
morally questionable (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Markowitz, 2012;
Markowitz & Shariff, 2012), demonstrating that such actions are un-
derstood as having reputational consequences.
We see our findings as providing an initial demonstration of concept
which, in addition to the reputational and punishment considerations
mentioned above, opens a range of novel and important future research
directions. As we noted, there may be several factors that increase the
non-monetary value or moral significance of a resource. These may
include the moral qualities of a resource (e.g., its sentience) triggering a
felt obligation to protect against harm or empathic responses to harm
but may also extend to its sentimental value (e.g., one's home), or
perhaps its beauty or rarity (e.g., natural environments). How these
various qualities are presented, such as whether they are concrete or
abstract, or whether resource-related outcomes are psychological or
temporally close vs. distant (see Trope & Liberman, 2010; Van Lange,
Joireman, & Milinski, 2018) relative to one's own needs or the needs of
other consumers may determine their relative impact on human co-
operation. Anticipated emotional outcomes, such as feelings of regret or
guilt, or even reputation-relevant emotions such as shame may also
play an important role. Research addressing these underlying me-
chanisms would provide insight into ways in which sources of resource-
centric value or moral significance could be exploited in applied and
scalable ways. Finally, our demonstration shows that the non-monetary
value of a resource increased cooperation across the board and was not
moderated by individual differences, thus providing some tentative
evidence for the generality of the present findings.
5.1. Limitations and future directions
There were several limitations of our studies that are worth noting.
First, we did not find any effects on implementing punishment, which is
surprising and may be related to aspects of our experimental design or
measures. Yet, it may be that costly punishment is most responsive to
perceived fairness in resource distribution, and resource-centric con-
cerns add little motivation. Second, we note that the use of live crickets
in our experimental method is certainly less than subtle, and it would
be important to show that subtler and perhaps more adaptable and
scalable interventions which seek to vary the non-monetary value of a
resource have the potential to change behavior. Third, it was impossible
for the experimenter to be blind to condition leaving open the possi-
bility of demand characteristics. This was, however, mitigated by
having each session split across conditions and the participants having
no visible contact with the experimenter during the resource dilemma
game (i.e., they were in separate fully enclosed cubicles). Fourth, it
could be that the participants were more motivated to please the ex-
perimenter in the experimental condition, by keeping the crickets alive.
That said, we would note that the experimenter did not indicate any
preference for keeping the crickets alive. Furthermore, to the extent
that participants might have been concerned about their own reputa-
tion we see this as part of the effect. The possibility that adding moral
significance to a resource may change behavior via reputational con-
cerns is an aspect of what we are focused on here.
5.2. Concluding remarks
Over the past three decades, scientists working in different dis-
ciplines have come to acknowledge that human behavior is shaped by
self-centered concerns as well as concerns for equality and the sa-
tisfaction of other's interests. The current research extends this picture
by proposing that human behavior may also be affected by vivid in-
formation regarding self-imposed harm to aspects of the natural en-
vironment. Going beyond cash and bringing crickets to the forefront as
a case in point, the findings provide critical theoretical insight for
modelling human behavior. They also open a new window of oppor-
tunity for behavior change. This is anything but trivial in era of climate
change, where the relationship between humans and the natural en-
vironment needs serious attention.
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